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This thesis presents a comparison and analysis of two Department of Defense 
(DoD) acquisition methods: the formal acquisition process and the Advanced Concept 
Technology Demonstration (ACTD). Both processes can be, and are, used by DoD to 
acquire information technology (IT), but while DoD has utilized the formal acquisition 
process for 30 years, the ACTD process is only 6 years old, and was specifically designed 
to improve upon the standard acquisition process (when applied to IT). By describing and 
studying the events surrounding, actors participating in, and results of one ACTD, this 
thesis will determine what lessons-learned can be applied to the standard acquisition 
process. While the ACTD and acquisition processes share some similarities in their 
management and funding, there are also significant differences. For example, ACTDs 
gain approval through a completely different process than acquisitions, and are subjected 
to less bureaucratic oversight. The recommendations provided in this thesis indicate that, 
based upon the experiences of the real-life ACTD sampled, the ACTD process does 
represent an improvement upon the standard acquisition process, specifically when the 
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The worldwide Information Technology (IT) industry is extremely fast moving, 
with new products, technologies, and standards being developed all the time. The 
Department of Defense (DoD) Acquisition Process, on the other hand, is traditionally 
slow moving, with years potentially elapsing between the initiation of a program and the 
fielding of a product. Realizing the disparity of timelines between the private sector 
driven domain of IT and the public sector DoD acquisition cycle, the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense created a new category of technology fielding program called the 
Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD). The goal of creating the ACTD 
process was to streamline and speed-up the fielding of mature technologies to 
warfighters. 
The acquisition process and the ACTD process differ in many respects, including 
their management structure, their funding profiles, and how each is initiated. Also, the 
potential outcomes of each process differ. That being said, similarities between ACTDs 
and acquisitions include the fact that both reside within the DoD, both require similar 
skill-sets of their managers, and both operate within the framework of the Planning, 
Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS). 
The goals of the ACTD and DoD 5000 acquisition processes are similar in that 
they both strive to satisfy requirements identified by warfighters. The difference is that 
the goal of the formal acquisition process is to fully develop and field a capability useful 
to warfighters, whereas ACTDs are intended to prove concepts. The Small Unit Logistics 
(SUL) ACTD was initiated in 1998 with the goal of becoming, via mature technology, an 
acquisition program. By studying the events and activities surrounding the SUL ACTD, 
as well as study of both the ACTD and acquisition processes, this thesis has identified 
areas in which the ACTD process represents an improvement, and distilled lessons that 
may improve upon the standard acquisition process.  
The procedural comparison of processes and case-study analysis of the SUL 
ACTD yielded the following results. First, ACTDs are much easier to initiate than 
acquisitions due to a streamlined selection/approval process. Second, while the ACTD 
 xvii
process itself is less structured and requires less reporting and documentation from its 
managers than formal acquisition, the processes were designed for different purposes, 
and streamlining the acquisition process would negate some of the advantages inherent in 
its relatively rigid structure. Third, the management structure of ACTDs provides some 
advantages over that of acquisitions, but is not necessarily an improvement. Lastly, the 
way in which ACTDs are funded represents an improvement upon acquisition funding 
since it frees managers from having to fight for funding on a yearly basis, giving them 




The Department of Defense (DoD) is an agency within the Executive Branch of 
the United States Government that requires the use of up-to-date information technology 
to effectively perform its function. As defined by statute, Information Technology (IT) 
 “… with respect to an Executive Agency means any equipment or 
interconnected system or subsystem of equipment that is used in the 
automatic acquisition, storage, manipulation, management, movement, 
control, display, switching, interchange, transmission, or reception of data 
or information…”1 
The worldwide IT industry is extremely fast moving, with new products, 
technologies, and standards being developed all the time. The DoD Acquisition Process, 
on the other hand, is traditionally slow moving, with years potentially elapsing between 
the initiation of a program and the fielding of a product. Realizing the disparity of 
timelines between the private sector driven domain of IT and the public sector DoD 
acquisition cycle, the Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) created a new technology 
fielding process called the Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD). The 
goal of creating the ACTD process was to streamline and speed-up the fielding of mature 
technologies to warfighters.  
"Demonstrations based on mature technologies may lead to more rapid 
fielding. Where appropriate, managers in the acquisition community shall 
make use of non-traditional acquisition techniques, such as Advanced 
Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTDs), rapid prototyping, 
evolutionary and incremental acquisition, and flexible technology 
insertion." 2 
By studying the processes followed, obstacles encountered, and experiences of 
one ACTD, this thesis will examine the following questions: Has the goal of establishing 
the ACTD alternative been met? If so, can lessons be distilled from an ACTD that may 
improve the standard acquisition process? If there are no advantages, should this 
alternative be removed from the options available to acquisition professionals? 
                                                 
1 Information Technology Management Reform Act Summary 
2 DoD 5000.2R, Para 2.7 
1 
The DoD 5000 series of directives is applicable to all the services, as are the 
directives establishing and directing ACTDs. Having stated that, this thesis will use as its 
primary source the procurement practices and processes of the United States Marine 
Corps. The decision to narrowly focus the scope was made for several reasons. The 
primary reason is that a complete study of the entire DoD Acquisition Process would 
require a much longer-term study. If such a task were undertaken, the result would be 
broadly focused, which would dilute the ACTD-specific recommendations this Thesis is 
attempting to make. A secondary reason is that the ACTD studied was focused on 
becoming a Marine Corps IT acquisition program. Therefore, only Marine Corps 
acquisition processes, within the scope of applicable DoD and DoN directives, will apply 
to this analysis. 
To conduct this research, an ACTD has been selected and its primary decision-
makers interviewed. The ACTD will be analyzed as a process whose goal is fielding an 
IT product to warfighters. When the analysis of the ACTD is complete, a comparison will 
be conducted between what actually took place during its lifecycle and the standard 
acquisition process. For the purpose of that comparison the process outlined in the DoD 
5000 series of publications will be utilized. The results of this comparison will assess the 
usefulness and applicability of the ACTD as an alternative to standard IT acquisition, 
highlight the differences between the two, and make recommendations based upon the 
results. 
2 
II. THE FORMAL ACQUISITION METHOD 
The Defense Department acquires goods and services based on a system governed 
by two documents, DoD 5000.1 The Defense Acquisition System and DoD 5000.2 
Operation of the Defense Acquisition System. Both are sub-documents to the Federal 
Acquisition Regulation, or FAR. These two references constitute both the Old and New 
Testaments to acquisition professionals. The “5000 Series”, as it is generally called, was 
introduced for the first time in 1971, and has since been revised 11 times. The most 
recent revision was signed on January 4th, 2001. For the purpose of comparison in this 
Thesis, the previous (1996 revision) 5000 Series document are used, since the subject 
ACTD occurred and was managed before the latest revision. 
An acquisition program is very strictly defined as: 
“A directed, funded effort designed to provide a new, improved, or 
continuing materiel, weapon or information system capability, or service, 
in response to a validated operational or business need.  Acquisition 
programs are divided into categories, which are established to facilitate 
decentralized decision-making, execution, and compliance with statutory 
requirements.” 3 
Additionally, an acquisition program is defined as an Automated Information System 
program (AIS) when it involves the use of IT. 
A. ACQUISITION CYCLE 
Within the Marine Corps, the acquisition process begins when a material or 
informational deficiency or capability is identified to the Marine Corps Combat 
Development Command (MCCDC), either by a Unified Command or a command within 
the Corps. If a committee decides to pursue the deficiency, a team is formed to develop a 
Mission Needs Statement (MNS). The MNS (ref. Figure 2-1) defines the projected needs 
for a capability in general operational terms that state desired mission objectives and 
general capabilities. The MNS will also describe nonmaterial and potential material 
alternatives (to meet the need), as well as goals and objectives for the acquisition, 
estimated operational environments, logistical constraints, and a rough order-of-
magnitude budgetary estimate. An acquisition program is formally initiated when the 
                                                 
3 DoD 5000.1, Enclosure 2, subparagraph E2.1.2 
3 
MNS is approved and signed by the designated approval authority: the Commanding 
General of the MCCDC.   
 
 
Figure 2-1. Acquisition Process-Overview (based upon 1996 DoD 5000.2) 
Once the draft MNS has been staffed and approved by the Assistant Commandant 
of the Marine Corps (ACMC), it is forwarded to the Milestone Decision Authority 
(MDA) for a Milestone 0 (MS0) “Determination of Mission Need” decision and the 
assignment of an Acquisition Category (ACAT). A listing of ACATs and the criteria for 
their assignment can be referenced in Appendix A. The ACAT is determined, program-
by-program, based on the type of acquisition and its estimated lifecycle cost. Once an 
ACAT has been assigned by the MDA, the staff of MARCORSYSCOM conducts a 
preliminary program assessment and assigns a Program manager (PM), giving him or her 
guidance on the overall program. These actions precipitate the Concept Exploration (CE 
or Phase 0) of the acquisition program, and are known as pre-MS0 activities. Figure 2-1 
shows the phases of the acquisition cycle, which officially begins with the Concept 
Exploration (CE) phase, as well as which Marine Corps activity takes the lead in each 
phase. A more detailed description of the Acquisition Phases will follow. 
 
4 
1. Phase 0 of the Acquisition Cycle 
Once a MNS has been approved by the appropriate MDA, the Concept 
Exploration Phase begins. The lead agency, in the case of the Marine Corps it is still 
MCCDC, will translate the operational requirements outlined in the MNS into an 
Operational Requirements Document, or ORD (see figure 2-2). The ORD will be in a 
standard format dictated by DoD 5000.2-R. 



























Figure 2-2. Phase 0 of the Acquisition 
Cycle 
“…the overall mission area, the 
type of system proposed and the 
anticipated operational and support 
concepts in sufficient detail for 
program and logistics support 
planning and includes a brief 
summary of the mission need.” 4 
Before the MDA can make a Milesotone 1 
(MS1) decision to move the program into 
Phase 1, several additional analyses and 
estimates will be conducted, including a 
Training Systems Requirements Analysis 
and a Preliminary Cost Estimate. Once the 
appropriate analyses have been performed 
the MDA can make the decision to formally 
initiate an Acquisition Program. This 
signifies that the mission needs outlined in 
the MNS, the operational requirements 
documented in the ORD, and the analyses 
and plans of the PM and working groups 
are sufficient. 
2. Phase 1 and 2 of the Acquisition Cycle 
The program begins Phase 1 after it receives MS1 approval to proceed. Phase 1 is 
known as the Program Definition and Risk Reduction (PDRR) Phase (ref. Figure 2-3). 
                                                 
4 NAWCTSC Acquisition Guide 5 
The Program Manager will form a series of working teams called Integrated Product 
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Figure 2-3. Phases 1 and 2 of the Acquisition Cycle 
The IPTs produce three important documents during PDRR. The first is the 
Acquisition Program Baseline (APB), which outlines the overall cost, schedule, and 
performance goals, strategies, and milestones for the acquisition program. The second is 
called the WBS, or Work Breakdown Structure. The WBS was specifically developed by 
DoD to help manage acquisition programs. Military Standard 881B defines a WBS as: 
 "…a product-oriented family tree composed of hardware, software, 
services, data and facilities.... [it] displays and defines the product(s) to be 
developed and/or produced and relates the elements of work to be 
accomplished to each other and to the end product(s)." 5 
Lastly, the teams will develop the third important Phase 1 document, a testing plan called 
the Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP). The TEMP outlines how the PM will test 
                                                 
5 Work Breakdown Structure 
6 
any components (may be software modules in AISs) and the end product, as well as the 
cost, schedule, and performance goals for testing. The IPTs will also create documents 
describing the tailored strategies that will be used during the rest of the acquisition 
process.  
The IPTs’ goal is to reduce the program’s risk of failure by planning extensively 
the critical path it must follow in order be successful. The plans will probably be revised 
during later stages of the acquisition process as more is learned about the program itself, 
but are required pieces of information that will allow the MDA make a Milestone 2 
(MSII) decision to pass the program into Phase 2, Engineering and Manufacturing 
Development (EMD).  
The EMD Phase (ref. Figure 2-3) is where the capabilities required of the 
program’s product will be explored. Prototypes will be constructed, sole-source or 
competitively bid contracts may be entered into with civilian contractors, and testing of 
the prototypes will be conducted (in accordance with the TEMP) to see if the capabilities 
outlined in the MNS have been achieved. The PM’s major activities in this phase are 
related to project management. He/she will be supervising the writing and awarding of 
one or more contracts, then supervising the cost, schedule, and performance outcomes of 
the contractors in relation to the APB. The PM is required by law to report on the 
progress of his/her program during all phases of the acquisition cycle, but more so during 
EMD because that is traditionally where most of the development cost is incurred. 
The EMD phase ends with the presentation to the MDA of documentation 
covering the performance of the prototype(s) as measured against the MNS and ORD. 
The MDA will make the decision at the end of EMD, known as the MS III decision, 
whether to continue the program and move into production, or to send the program back 
to Phase 1 for further planning and refinement. 
3. Phase 3 of the Acquisition Cycle 
If a program passes the MSIII decision point, it will enter the Production, 
Deployment & Operational Support phase, also known as PD/OS or Phase III. During 
this phase the program’s product is produced and fielded to operational units. The PM 
will conduct (or hire a contractor to perform) acceptance testing, and will also begin 
7 
implementing plans for upgrades or revisions to the 
product, actions known as life cycle support or LCS 
(ref. Figure 2-4). Phase III plans (outlined in the 
APB) will cover the product to the end of its active 
life cycle, which can last for decades in some cases. 
Once the program’s product has been fielded and is 
no longer being produced or upgraded, management 
of the asset(s) is turned over to the logistical agencies 
resident in the Marine Corps or the 
MARCORSYSCOM. That agency or department 
handles the product until the end of its active service. 
It is worth noting that the development of IT 
products via the standard Acquisition Cycle doesn’t 
differ significantly from the acquisition of non-IT 
material. The main differences between the two 
involve the reporting and decision-making (i.e. 
MDA) bodies and/or individuals. In most cases PMs 
are allowed the freedom to tailor their IT acquisition 
programs to reflect the intellectual and 
developmental differences between IT acquisitions 





























Figure 2-4. Phase 3 Activities
B. PROGRAM FUNDING 
Planning and funding for acquisition programs begins after valid requirements 
have been identified and a material solution is sought to fulfill them. As with all DoD 
Agencies and the other Services, Marine Corps acquisition programs are funded with 
money assigned in the Congressionally-approved DoD Budget. As part of the Planning, 
Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS), the services submit to Congress (through 
DoD) their list of proposed programs and the schedule for funding them. The overall 
programmatic budget is referred to as the Future Years Defense Plan, or FYDP. The 
FYDP is 
8 
 ”… a database that summarizes all resources, over an eleven-year period, 
associated with programs approved by the SECDEF for the DoD. The 
FYDP is the vehicle that allows DoD to take a multi-year focus for 
resource allocation…”6  
Individual programs are assigned one or two-year budgets based upon what type 
of funding they are using to accomplish their mission. Monies are approved by Congress 
in the form of Appropriations, which provide authority for Federal agencies to incur 
obligations and make payments for specified purposes out of the treasury. For its 
acquisition programs, the Marine Corps budgets from its Research, Development, Testing 
& Evaluation (RDT&E), Procurement Marine Corps (PMC), and Procurement of 
Ammunition, Navy and Marine Corps (PANMC) accounts. 
The significance of funding for programs cannot be emphasized enough, because 
within the Services’ budgets for acquisition, there is in most cases competition between 
programs for money. The Secretary of Defense and the Service Secretaries are afforded a 
certain amount of freedom to re-direct funds they have been budgeted. That freedom is 
necessary in order to cover cost overruns that some programs incur, as well as to allow 
the Secretaries to establish and rearrange priorities within their departments. Funding is 
also important because the PPBS works in a two-year cycle that forces the Services to 
reanalyze their programs’ necessity, and since very few acquisition programs are 
completed within that timeframe, the managerial overhead associated with planning, 
budgeting, and tracking expenses is quite high. 
C. MANAGERIAL ISSUES 
The management of an acquisition program involves, to a large extent, the 
planning, tracking, and supervision of three competing objectives: cost, schedule, and 
performance. Of the three, cost is usually the most important variable, and the concept of 
Cost as an Independent Variable (CAIV) is taught, preached, and stressed to all 
participants in the acquisition process. Deciding to make trade-offs by sacrificing one or 
two variables to optimize the third is an accepted part of acquisition process. 
Within the structure of the Acquisition Cycle as it is outlined in DoD 5000.1 and 
5000.2, Program Managers are afforded (and directed to exercise) the freedom to tailor 
                                                 
6 US Navy N-6 PPBS Tutorial 
9 
their managerial practices to fit the needs of their acquisition program. This relative 
freedom is necessary because it is understood that there is no single best way to construct 
an acquisition program so that it accomplishes the objectives of the Defense Acquisition 
System. To help accomplish those myriad objectives, the process of Tailoring can be 
applied to 
 “…various aspects of the acquisition system, including program 
documentation, acquisition phases, the timing and scope of decision 
reviews, and decision levels.”7 
To increase the proficiency and professionalism of the acquisition workforce (as 
well as logistics and technology communities), DoD 5000.1, Section 4.5.6 directs the 
Department of Defense to establish training, education, and experience standards for each 
managerial level involved in the acquisition process. The establishment of professional 
training and education standards was mandated by the Defense Acquisition Workforce 
Improvement Act (DAWIA), which  
“…requires the Secretary of Defense, acting through the Under Secretary 
of Defense (Acquisition & Technology), to establish education and 
training standards, requirements, and courses for the civilian and military 
acquisition workforce.”8 
In addition to tailoring, another managerial concept/practice is central to the 
acquisition process, a concept called Integrated Product and Process Development 
(IPPD). The DoD defines IPPD as,  
"A management process that integrates all activities from product concept 
through production/field support, using a multifunctional team, to 
simultaneously optimize the product and its manufacturing and 
sustainment processes to meet cost and performance objectives." IPPD 
evolved from concurrent engineering, and is sometimes called integrated 
product development (IPD). It is a systems-engineering process integrated 
with sound business practices and common sense decision-making. One of 
the key tenets of IPPD is that of multidisciplinary teamwork via Integrated 
Product Teams (IPTs).”9 
                                                 
7 DoD 5000.1, Section 4.5.1 
8 Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act 
9 IPPD/IPT; US Navy Acquisition Reform Website 
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The use of IPTs is a teamwork approach to implementing IPPD whose goal is to 
make the right decision at the right time. The IPTs themselves are composed of 
functional representatives from appropriate disciplines, brought together as necessary to 
identify and resolve issues, make sound and timely decisions, and build successful and 
balanced programs. Team members are expected to accept team input and make team 
decisions, putting the needs of the respective program ahead of their organizations’ 
interests when assigned to an IPT. Since they are stakeholders in the acquisition process, 
many IPTs will include contractors, suppliers and customers. 
Section 7.6 of DoD 5000.2-R outlines the formation of and duties expected from 
IPTs for high-level and/or high-cost programs. Component Acquisition Executives 
(CAEs) are afforded the flexibility to tailor IPTs for programs not assigned ACAT ID or 
IAM that fall under their cognizance (ref. Appendix A for ACAT categories). 
Teams are formed according to their function they are expected to perform. For 
example, executive decision-makers may be included in an Overarching IPT (OIPT), 
which is formed whenever a department intends to start an acquisition program. OIPTs 
are the charter organization of all subordinate teams. Normal IPTs are referred to as 
Working-level IPTs (WIPT). If the acquisition program involves the integration of parts, 
software modules, or any other numerous or complicated components, an Integration IPT 
(IIPT) may be formed, although it is considered a type of WIPT. When a 
cost/performance/schedule trade-off is necessitated, a Cost/Performance IPT (CPIPT) 
will convene. 
D. CONCLUSION 
The formal acquisition process is guided very specifically by DoD 5000.1 and 
DoD 5000.2-R. Those two documents outline a structured process that is divided into 
specific phases, which are separated by milestone decision points. Law in most cases 
requires program Managers to submit periodic reports and detailed documentation 
concerning their programs to an OIPT and/or their CAE. 
Acquisition programs are funded from a variety of DoD allocations, all of which 
must be periodically reviewed via the PPBS, which forces services to re-justify their 
acquisitions every year. Management tools mandated to PMs to help manage their 
11 
programs include Tailoring and IPPD. Both encourage PMs to streamline the traditionally 
time-intensive acquisition process when applying it to their individual program. 
12 
III. THE ADVANCED CONCEPT TECHNOLOGY 
DEMONSTRATION 
 The ACTD process was conceived as a response to problems within the 
acquisition system. The complex cycle, with its many levels of oversight and approval, 
created a series of problems, notably mentioned in the Packard Commission’s 1986 
report A Formula for Action: 
“A serious result of this management environment is an unreasonably long 
acquisition cycle – ten to fifteen years for our major weapon systems. It is 
a central problem from which most other acquisition problems stem: 
- It leads to unnecessarily high cost of development 
- It leads to obsolete technology in our fielded equipment  
- And it aggravates the very gold plating that is one of its causes …”10 
The ACTD program was initiated in early 1994 as a response to these problems, 
and was designed to speed the transition of technology to military users. The focus of 
ACTDs is not on technology development, but on evaluation and incorporation. The goal 
“…is to provide a prototype capability to the warfighter and to support him in the 
evaluation of that capability.”11 ACTDs are considered pre-acquisition activities, a sort of 
low-cost way of assessing the risks and uncertainties associated with technological 
projects before the technology becomes incorporated into a formal acquisition program. 
The ACTD process is designed to quickly respond to an urgent military need by 
employing available, mature technologies. The procedural design is considerably more 
focused than the standard acquisition process, applying solely to technology and it’s 
application to real-life needs. The Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology, and Logistics (USD A&T) website includes a very concise summation: 
“Under ACTDs, systems are designed, fabricated, and then demonstrated 
in realistic combat exercises to gain an understanding of the military 
utility of the system, to support development of the associated concept of 
                                                 
10 Cycle Time Reduction – Notable Quotes; http://www.acq-ref.navy.mil/ctrquotes.html 
11 Introduction to ACTDs; http://www.acq.osd.mil/actd/intro.htm 
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operations, and to place a limited but demonstrated capability into the 
hands of the warfighter at the conclusion of the ACTD. When additional 
quantities or capabilities are required to meet the full military requirement, 
the system enters the acquisition process at the point that is appropriate 
given the level of developmental maturity.”12 
Ten ACTDs were initiated during 1995, the first year after the process was 
authorized, and their numbers have been increasing yearly, as shown in Table 1.  
Table 1: Selected Yearly Total ACTDs 






Most recently, sixty potential ACTDs were proposed for fiscal year 2001. 
A. CANDIDATE FORMULATION AND SELECTION PHASE 
 Early in the 
first quarter of each fiscal 
year, an invitation is 
extended from the Deputy 
Undersecretary of Defense 
for Advanced Systems and 
Concepts (DUSD AS&C) 
to the Unified Commands, 
Services, and Defense 
Agencies. The invitation is 
for new ACTD proposals, 
which are due the 
following January. Since 
Figure 3-1. Formulation & Selection Phase 
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12 DoD Guide to IPPD; www.acq.osd.mil/io/se/ippd/guide/acquisition.html 
the invitation is addressed to the executive 
level, laboratories and individual warfighting 
units are not extended invitations, so must 
inform their chain of command of any desire to 












































 ACTDs can be initiated from several 
directions: requirements pull and technology 
push (ref. Figure 3-1). The occasion for 
requirements pull would be when an 
operational unit identifies a critical military 
requirement up its chain of command, which 
then responds to the ACTD invitation by 
submitting a proposal. Technology push, on the 
other hand, occurs when a defense lab or 
civilian organization identifies an emerging 
(but still mature) technology that can possibly 
provide military utility. Either way, with the 
ACTD selection process, special effort is given 
to let warfighters decide which needs receive 
the highest priority and thus funding. In the 
lexicon of ACTDs, technologists are called 
Technical Managers (TM), and warfighters are 
referred to as Operational Managers (OM). In 
all cases, close cooperation between the two is 
highly encouraged since it increases the 
chances not only of a proposal being accepted 
as an ACTD, but also the chances of the ACTD 
coming to a successful conclusion. 
Figure 3-2. Selection Review 
Process 
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Once proposals are received by the DUSD (AS&C), a series of briefings to OSD, 
Service, and Joint Staff representatives takes place (ref. Figure 3-2), as well as 
presentations to Congressional committees. During the candidate formulation and 
selection phase, the TM and OM work on refining their proposal and the myriad plans it 
entails, in effect pre-planning their ACTD. They also work to secure funding sources and 
try to gain the support of/sell their proposal to the user community who stands to benefit 
from their project. The stages of review work as a filtering process, wherein the level of 
detail required and criticality of the reviewers increases in each stage. For example, 
during fiscal year 2001, sixty proposed ACTDs were reduced in number to 25 before 
being reviewed by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC). After the JROC 
review, the candidate ACTDs on the prioritized list will have their plans reviewed by the 
OSD, and will have them presented to several Congressional committees. Factors that can 
de-rail candidate ACTDs during the final stages of review include funding. For example, 
after the 25 previously mentioned 2001 ACTD candidates were reviewed for funding, 
only 14 passed muster. The final portion of the formulation and selection phase is the 
presentation of the Selection List to the USD (A&T), whose signature gives approval to 
execute proposed ACTDs. That signature will be placed upon the first important 
document in the ACTD process, the Implementation Directive (ID). 
According to the ACTD Manager’s Guide, the ID:  
“…clarifies the roles and responsibilities of all the parties involved in 
ACTD execution. It is intended to provide unambiguous top level 
guidance prior to approval of the ACTD. This two or three page document 
is prepared by the proposing developer and user. It defines the operational 
capability to be demonstrated, general approach, participating agencies, 
transition path(s), and approximate funding and schedule.”13 
It is, in effect, a capstone document that summarizes proposed ACTD actions 
prior to its approval. The approved ACTD IDs are signed after Congress approves the 
Defense budget, and will also be signed, as a basic ‘contract’, by senior three-star-level 
executives from all participating agencies. 
B. MIDDLE PHASE OF ACTD LIFECYCLE 
The time taken from the USD (A&T) invitation for ACTDs to his/her signature on 
the approved IDs is usually less than a year. In comparison, the middle phase, where the 
bulk of energy and money is spent, typically lasts two to four years.  
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ACTD Manager’s Guide 
Once a candidate ACTDs ID has been signed by the USD (A&T), the focus of the 
TM/OM team becomes the Management Plan (MP). In fact, the ID – the ‘What’ of the 
ACTD - must include a statement directing timely completion of the MP – the ‘How’ of 
the ACTD’. The MP is drafted for two purposes: as a baseline management document for 
the ACTDs Oversight Group (its OIPT) and as a management tool to be used by the TM, 
OM, and Transition Manager (XM). Much of the information included in the MP can be 
transferred directly from the ID. The ACTD process is designed to provide: 
“…flexibility and avoidance of excessive rigidity/formality in 
documentation and process. Hence, the MP is intended to be an executive-
level document (ideally, less than 25 pages) written in informal 
language.”14 
The TM, OM, and XM designees will usually draft the MP, with assistance from other 
participants in the process, and officials at the one-star level will sign it. The MP is due to 
the DUSD (AS&C) for his/her signature 90 days after an ACTD is approved, so it is 
incumbent upon a demonstration’s managers to begin drafting it during the formulation 
and selection phase.  
Figure 3-3. Middle Phase of ACTD Lifecycle 
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 There are three interdependent activities (see figure 3-3) that must take place 
during the middle phase of an ACTD: Transition Planning & Preparation (TPP), System 
Engineering Integration & Testing (SEI&T), and Military Utility Assessment (MUA). All 
three activities are completed with the combined efforts of the TM, XM, and OM but 
each individual manager will take the lead in his/her respective specialty. 
1. Transition Planning and Preparation 
An ACTDs ID will identify a Lead Service to spearhead the demonstration’s 
management. The XM is usually assigned by a Lead Service acquisition agency, and as 
the title implies, transition planning is his/her responsibility. The XM will use the MP as 
a baseline to begin up-front planning for several possible outcomes of an ACTD 
transition decision, even though that decision won’t be made until the end of MUA. The 
TPP activity: 
 “…addresses two aspects of fielding the ACTD capability. The first deals 
with fielding the residual ACTD capability to provide an immediate 
operational capability in a limited deployment. The second deals with 
replicating the capability to provide for much wider deployment. This 
requires the ACTD to transition to a formal acquisition program.”15 
Both fielding of the ACTD residual and planning for a formal transition require extensive 
planning, and to accomplish transition planning correctly, the XM will often include 
experts in areas like acquisition, software support/training, logistics, and contracting in 
IPTs to assist with the planning function. 
The XM’s transition plans are staffed to the Oversight Committee, as well as the 
TM and OM, well before a transition decision is made concerning the ACTD. The XM 
will include representatives from potential acquiring organizations (like 
MARCORSYSCOM) in his/her transition planning since, if a wider-deployment decision 
is made, all the advanced planning will allow such a decision to be implemented with a 
minimum of delay and little loss of programmatic momentum. 
                                                 
15 ACTD Manager’s Guide 
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2. System Engineering Integration & Test 
The objective of the SEI&T activities is to integrate already-developed, mature 
technologies: 
“…by means of system engineering and system integration to create a 
desired technical capability which, when combined with appropriate 
CONOPS [Concept of Operations] results in a new or improved military 
capability. Testing is required to characterize system performance and 
verify everything is working before demonstrating the system in an 
operational environment.”16 
Success during the SEI&T stage of an ACTD requires effort and expertise from 
professionals in areas such as project management, engineering, and information 
technology. The TM, who takes the lead in the SEI&T activity, must have some skill 
level in all these areas as well as others not listed, and will attempt throughout SEI&T to 
keep the focus of all participants on developing military utility. 
Much of the SEI&T planning, like TPP, will take place before the MP is 
approved. This is necessary in order to gather and involve necessary expertise, as well as 
plan and perform the SEI&T activities, while still meeting the compressed timeline of the 
ACTD process. Several examples of areas needing up-front planning are contract 
management, contractor identification, scope/definition of the system, and budgeting for 
SEI&T activities. In many cases, ACTD managers rely on a Work Breakdown Structure  
(or something closely resembling a WBS) to help plan their activities, even though the 
ACTD process does not require it. 
The jobs of the TM and OM during SEI&T closely mirror the activities of an 
acquisition PM during the EMD phase of a formal acquisition program – tracking cost, 
schedule, and performance. As previously mentioned, strong project management skills 
are a must to successfully make the ACTDs system ready for its MUA, demonstration, 
and transition. The TM/OM activities during this stage of the ACTDs lifecycle will 
directly support efforts of the XM for the ACTDs transition. For example, the 
affordability of demonstration systems and their support (logistics, personnel, and 
documentation) must be planned for and executed in order to make the system ‘sell’ to 
                                                 
16 ACTD Manager’s Guide 
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operational users (and acquisition commands) at the conclusion of the ACTD. To be 
successful during SEI&T, the TM and OM need to 
“…implement a balanced system engineering and testing approach that 
qualifies the system to enter LRIP without encumbering the ACTD with 
the extensive process and paperwork that has evolved under formal 
acquisition procedures.”17 (Italics added) 
Extensive user participation in the SEI&T effort is encouraged, and will be coordinated 
with and by the OM. This encourages feedback between the SEI&T and TPP processes, 
and hence increases the chances of concluding a successful ACTD. 
A Demonstration Readiness Review (DRR) concludes the SEI&T phase. The 
DRR is needed because:  
“It is extremely important to confirm dependable system operation before 
committing to a field demonstration event such as an exercise that 
includes large numbers of operations and planning personnel. There 
should be no need to trouble shoot either individual equipment 
malfunctions or subsystem interfaces in the field where time and resource 
pressures are severe. ”18 
The DRR includes an end-to-end system test to ensure reliable operation of the 
system, as well as its subsystems and support personnel/operators. Test performance of 
the system is usually characterized by minimum and maximum expected functionality. 
That characterization will influence the assessment of the actual demonstration, overall 
transitional activities, and the final CONOPS produced by the ACTD managers. Also, 
various activities, such as the drafting and approval of Interoperability Assessments, 
Environmental Impact Statements, and Safety Certifications must be taken care of before 
a real-life demonstration. 
3. Military Utility Assessment 
The MUA is the heart of the ACTD process since its primary goal is to evaluate 
technological contributions to military capability. According to the ACTD Manager’s 
Guide, an MUA: 
“… is a judgment of the military worth of a proposed capability. The 
assessment is performed by evaluating performance measured in an 
                                                 
17 ACTD Manager’s Guide 
18 ACTD Manager’s Guide 
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operationally realistic environment against critical operational issues. The 
assessment considers operational effectiveness and suitability in 
performing the assigned mission (can it do the job?) and overall 
importance to the success of military operations (so what?) in judging 
military worth.”19 
An MUA is performed by warfighters and coordinated principally by the OM, in keeping 
with the operational focus of ACTDs. Effectiveness and aptness requires testing in an 
operation, for which purpose the ACTD managers will either plan an operation for their 
purpose or piggyback on an existing operation. One or more operations in which the 
ACTD system is demonstrated are used to collect data, which will then be evaluated to 
determine military utility. 
 The results of a MUA can range from a determination that the ACTD technology 
provides significant utility to a conclusion that it has no utility. In either case, a 
successful MUA will provide a conclusion that can withstand serious analyses. A parallel 
can be drawn to the Operational Tests that are run on products of the acquisition cycle 
during its EMD phase, but without the rigor and formality. 
 As with TPP and SEI&T, a significant amount of preplanning is required of the 
OM, who will get assistance from and coordinate with the XM and TM. Since an MUA 
can be a major undertaking involving multiple services, defense agencies/organizations, 
and possibly foreign participants, the job of OM is extremely vital for MUA to not only 
occur, but also succeed. The OM’s major duties in relation to the ACTD involve planning 
for, conducting, and reporting upon the MUA. He/she is also the provider and coordinator 
of user participation in the SEI&T process. 
The OM will use many military-style planning skills in the conduct of his/her 
duties, which begin before the ID is approved with preplanning. The OM of an ACTD 
will prepare a plan, called an Assessment Plan, outlining the cost, schedule, and 
performance outcomes of the MUA (which may be a process unto itself). As with the 
TM, a WBS-like work structure can be constructed to help guide the OM’s planning 
activities. There are no formal reporting requirements in the ACTD process regarding the 
Assessment Plan, but approval by the User Sponsor – the organization that assigns the 
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OM – is usually required, as are briefings and updates to the Oversight Group. The 
Assessment Plan is intended to be a ‘living’ document, updated as the ACTD matures. 
As previously mentioned, the MUA will involve at least one operational 
demonstration. The TM, OM, and XM to update their plans as appropriate, will use the 
results of and data collected from demonstrations. The MUA will conclude with the 
submittal of an Assessment Report (AR) to the Oversight Group and the User, Technical, 
and Transitional Sponsors. The AR will provide substantiated conclusions regarding the 
military capability (or lack thereof) provided by the ACTDs system. The results of the 
report will form the basis of the true MUA output: the Transition Recommendation. 
C. TRANSITION PHASE OF ACTD LIFECYCLE 
Following completion of the AR, the ACTD will enter its transition. The possible 
outcomes of the Transition Decision are planned for during the middle phase of the 
lifecycle (and previously explained in section B-1) are: 
1. Transition to a formal acquisition program and field residual system(s) 
2. Field residual system(s) only 
3. Terminate the ACTD 
The decision to transition (to an acquisition) can be made during any period of the 
ACTD product’s lifecycle. If such a decision is made within two years of the ACTDs 
completion and the residual is still in use, the ACTD managers will be responsible for the 
transfer of knowledge to the acquisition organization. If the decision is made after the 
two-year mark, the operational units using the residual will be responsible for transferring 
knowledge of the product to the acquisition agency. The OM will also participate in some 
transitional activities, such as planning for fielding of the residual capability, 
coordinating fielding requirements, and developing the ORD as needed. Close 
cooperation between all three managers (TM, OM, and XM) is, of course, required to 
make transition successful. These options, as well as the inputs to the Transition 
Decision/Phase can be viewed in Figure 3-4. 
The managers of an ACTD will present the AR to the Oversight Group as well as 
the Lead Service for review. Smooth transition, no matter which conclusion is reached 
regarding transition, depends entirely upon prior planning. Transition, including fielding 
of residual capabilities, is the responsibility of the Lead Service, and will depend in large 
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part upon the skill of and working relationship between the OM and XM. The most 
stress-free outcome, of course, would be to terminate the ACTD, but even that decision 
can be a valuable one since it saves the spending of time and resources on technology that 
has no utility. The non-transitioned products can be returned to the defense lab or agency 
that owns them for possible further refinement, which may eventually provide utility 

























Figure 3-4. Transition Phase 
If testing and evaluation of the ACTD product demonstrates military utility, the residual 
products may be transferred to an operational organization. That transfer will provide 
information back to the ACTD managers in the form of Extended User Evaluation 
(EUE). The cost to the ACTD of EUE is funding two years of technical, engineering, and 
sustaining support of their product at the operational unit(s). If military utility has been 
demonstrated and a wider deployment is needed, the XM will execute plans to transition 
the ACTD into an acquisition program. 
D. ACTD FUNDING 
Unlike formal acquisition programs, which must be funded from within the PPBS, 
ACTDs solely rely upon R&D funds to accomplish their mission. For most ACTDs, 
about 10% of the total cost is covered by funds from the DUSD (AS&C). The OSD 
supplemental funding: 
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 “ …is for (1) integration of the technologies with existing systems for the 
demonstration, (2) providing multiple copies of system elements where 
that is critical to the user's evaluation of military utility, and (3) technical 
support of the residual capability, during which time the user will continue 
to evaluate the concept during routine training activities and will continue 
to mature the concepts of operation. Proposals for OSD funding should be 
coordinated with ODUSD/AT during the formulation phase.”20 
The R&D funds, which must cover the other 90% of an ACTDs total cost, usually come 
from technology programs such as defense labs and research agencies. 
 To better understand R&D funding, it may be useful to explain how R&D funds 
are allocated to the services. On a yearly basis, the R&D budgets of the respective 
services stay relatively constant as compared to procurement funding. This is in large part 
due to the fact that R&D funding requests are not subjected to the PPBS. This allows the 
services to plan their R&D spending on a relatively stable basis. The Science 
&Technology (S&T) budgets of agencies like the Defense Advanced Research Program 
Agency (DARPA), and the Office of Naval Research (ONR) are composed, in large part, 
of R&D funds transferred from the services. The spending of R&D funds is monitored by 
mandating spending according to a few categorical definitions, which are listed in Table 
2-2. Funding for ACTDs falls at or above the 6.3 category since ACTDs are based upon 
mature technology. 
Just because funding for the ACTD itself comes from R&D doesn’t mean that the 
managers can ignore the PPBS and POM (Program Objectives Memorandum) however. 
Since one of the goals of ACTDs is to possibly transition into an acquisition system, 
certain events within the ACTD process can be timed to facilitate that possible outcome.  
 “Funding for follow-on acquisition must, at some point, be included in the 
Lead Service POM. Scheduling MUA to provide emerging results at 
critical points during the POM cycle will provide added justification for 
essential programming and budgeting actions.”21 
This sort of scheduling will be included in the preplanning activities of both the XM and 
OM, with assistance from a Lead Service acquisition agency. 
Table 2: Technology Readiness Levels and Their Definitions [from DoD 5000.2-R f] 
                                                 
20 ACTD Guidelines: Formulation, Selection, and Initiation 
21 ACTD Manager’s Guide 
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Technology Readiness Level Description 
1.  Basic principles observed and reported. Lowest level of technology readiness.  
Scientific research begins to be translated into 
technology’s basic properties. 
2.  Technology concept and/or application 
formulated. 
Invention begins.  Once basic principles 
are observed, practical applications can be invented.  
The application is speculative and there is no proof 
or detailed analysis to support the assumption.  
Examples are still limited to paper studies. 
3.  Analytical and experimental critical 
function and/or characteristic proof of concept. 
Active research and development is 
initiated.  This includes analytical studies and 
laboratory studies to physically validate analytical 
predictions of separate elements of the technology.  
Examples include components that are not yet 
integrated or representative. 
4.  Component and/or breadboard 
validation in laboratory environment. 
Basic technological components are 
integrated to establish that the pieces will work 
together.  This is relatively “low fidelity” compared 
to the eventual system.  Examples include 
integration of “ad hoc” hardware in a laboratory. 
5.  Component and/or breadboard 
validation in relevant environment. 
Fidelity of breadboard technology 
increases significantly.  The basic technological 
components are integrated with reasonably realistic 
supporting elements so that the technology can be 
tested in simulated environment.  Examples include 
“high fidelity” laboratory integration of 
components. 
6.  System/subsystem model or prototype 
demonstration in a relevant environment. 
Representative model or prototype system, 
which is well beyond the breadboard tested for level 
5, is tested in a relevant environment.  Represents a 
major step up in a technology’s demonstrated 
readiness.  Examples include testing a prototype in a 
high fidelity laboratory environment or in simulated 
operational environment. 
7.  System prototype demonstration in an 
operational environment. 
Prototype near or at planned operational 
system.  Represents a major step up from level 6, 
requiring the demonstration of an actual system 
prototype in an operational environment.  Examples 
include testing the prototype in a test bed aircraft. 
8.  Actual system completed and qualified 
through test and demonstration. 
Technology has been proven to work in its 
final form and under expected conditions.  In almost 
all cases, this level represents the end of true system 
development.  Examples include developmental test 
and evaluation of the system in its intended weapon 
system to determine if it meets design 
specifications. 
9.  Actual system proven through 
successful mission operations. 
Actual application of the technology in its 
final form and under mission conditions, such as 
those encountered in operational test and evaluation. 
E. ACTD MANAGEMENT ISSUES 
 The management of an ACTD has many program-management related activities 
in common with formal acquisitions. For example, both are encouraged to use IPPD to 
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their advantage, both allow and encouraged tailoring of reporting and documentation 
requirements to specific needs, and both require skilled management. Past those 
commonalities, the differences end. 
 An ACTD is essentially run by its DUSD (A&T)-assigned and JROC-
recommended Lead Agency, which usually provides an ACTDs OM and XM. The TM is 
usually assigned from a technology lab. The fact that there are three co-equal managers, 
each responsible for interdependent ACTD activities, as well as reporting to different 
agencies, can present opportunities for conflict if all three don’t work well together. It is 
essential to the success of the process that the goals and activities associated with the 
ACTD be made absolutely clear to each manager so they have a common focus. 
 From a managerial perspective, the ACTD process is designed to provide 
maximum flexibility, with minimal reporting and documentation requirements. To that 
end, only two procedural documents require executive-level review: the ID and the MP. 
Oversight of ACTD activities is taken care of by Oversight Groups, which typically 
meets every six months to review the ACTDs under their purview.  For reporting 
purposes, the mangers submit monthly milestone/event achievement reports to the DUSD 
(AS&C). 
F. CONCLUSION 
The ACTD process is designed to rapidly incorporate mature technologies into 
operational units, with minimal reporting and documentation. The focus of all ACTDs is 
on warfighter requirements, and operational users are extensively involved in the ACTD 
process. ACTDs are assigned to a Lead Service during their first phase, Formulation and 
Selection. After an ACTDs ID has been signed, it has been approval to proceed into the 
second phase, which will be guided by an executively-approved MP. 
An ACTDs managers are referred to as the OM, TM, and XM, and each will take 
the lead in one of three second-phase activities. Those interdependent activities, which 
occur simultaneously, are: TPP, SEI&T, MUA. The second phase concludes with one or 
more ACTD demonstrations, which are operational exercises. During the exercise(s), 
data will be collected which will help determine the military utility of an ACTD system. 
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Phase two ends when the OM submits an AR to the Lead Service decision authority. The 
ACTD will then enter its third phase, called the Transition Phase. 
Once MUA has been completed, the Lead Service decision authority makes a 
transition decision. There are three options: fielding of ACTD residual to operational 
users and transition to an acquisition program, fielding of residual only, or termination of 
the ACTD. In the first two instances, the technology lab that developed the capability is 
responsible for fielding the residual product (including training, logistical support, and 
spare parts) for a period of two years. 
ACTDs are funded with Research and Development monies, which fall under a 
different oversight process than the funds used for formal acquisition programs. That fact 
provides an advantage in that spending Research and Development funds involves less 
legal oversight and bureaucratic procedural overhead than does acquisition spending. 
The management of an ACTD is complex since it involves not one but three 
managers. The managers will require many of the same skills as an acquisition Program 
Manager however, and rely upon some of the same precepts like Integrated Product and 


































































IV. THE SMALL UNIT LOGISTICS ADVANCED CONCEPT 
TECHNOLOGY DEMONSTRATION 
A. PRE-ACTD SUL HISTORY 
During his tour as Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Charles Krulak 
made a concerted effort to insert modern technological advances into Marine Corps 
tactics and techniques. To that end, in 1996 he initiated a five-year Advanced 
Warfighting Experiment (AWE), which was essentially an Advanced Technology 
Demonstration, or ATD. An ATD is similar to an Advanced Concept Technology 
Demonstration (ACTD) in form and function, varying in that ATDs are conducted to 
demonstrate technologic feasibility and maturity, whereas ACTDs deal only with mature 
technology. Also, ATDs are service-specific while ACTDs are joint endeavors. 
To conduct the AWE, which was called Sea Dragon, a Special Purpose Marine 
Air-Ground Task Force was formed constituting 2000 active-duty Marines and sailors. 
The organization of any Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) includes a Command 
Element, a Ground Combat Element, an Air Combat Element, and a Combat Service 
Support Element (CSSE). Sea Dragon’s first operation was conducted in March 1997, 
with subsequent operations held all over the continental United States.  
One of the areas that the Sea Dragon AWE focused upon was the application of 
technology to improve the command and control capabilities of Marine CSSE’s. The 
need to manage the flow of supplies and services was identified because logisticians 
“…currently manage this flow manually, much as they have been doing 
since the inception of amphibious operations. Voice radio is still the 
primary means of communications, with hand carried information the 
primary back up. TAV [Total Asset Visibility] does not exist insofar as 
one person can communicate with all of the operational participants – 
again, manually. The staff planning and decision-making processes for 
commanders are still dependent on face-to-face communications and 
meetings, grease pencils, and flip charts.”22 
The Combat Service and Support (CSS) units participating in Sea Dragon developed a 
number of software applications, which they used to try and optimize the CSS provided 
                                                 
22 Modernization for the Logistics Tactical Commander, pg. 1 
29 
to the Special-Purpose MAGTF. Those applications, and the improvements in CSS they 
attempted, gained the attention of the Office of Naval Research (ONR), which spent 
approximately $350,000 in Fiscal Year (FY) 97 contracting programmers to streamline 
their design and coding. The ONR also spent $1,000,000 in FY98, again in support of 
Sea Dragon-related logistical command and control (C2) software applications. 
The logistics C2 applications were utilized with some success during Sea Dragon 
exercises, but what captured attention more than the software was the concept of using 
software and modern communications methods to speed Combat Service Support (CSS) 
to over-the-horizon combat units, an idea that had not been explored at the tactical level 
until Sea Dragon. 
ONR support for the logistics software was significant for several reasons. The 
first is that ONR continued following and supporting progress over several years. A 
second reason is that the concept behind the applications was developed by and for the 
warfighters themselves, a key tenet of the ACTD process. The third is that ONR, through 
its technical support, came to the attention of Brigadier General Richard Kelly, the 
commander of 1st Force Service Support Group (1st FSSG), which conceived and built a 
handful of Sea Dragon CSS software applications. The thought that went into building 
and fielding those applications was the equivalent of requirements definition since the 
Marines had neither the time nor resources to invest in unneeded functionality. 
B. SUL FORMULATION AND SELECTION PHASE 
The afore-mentioned background is relevant in order to explain how The Small 
Unit Logistics (SUL) ACTD came about. In the case of SUL, the formal invitation issued 
by the DUSD (AS&C) was not what generated the ACTD. In the early summer of 1998, 
General Kelly attended a conference in Monterey California. While attending the 
conference, he had a chance to directly chat with the representatives from the 
Undersecretary of Defense (Acquisitions and Technology) USD (A&T). Their 
discussions crystallized the idea of initiating an ACTD to explore tactical CSS. General 
Kelly briefed the Breakfast Club later that summer and received favorable feedback. As 
important was a favorable recommendation from the Deputy Undersecretary of Defense 
for Advanced Systems and Concepts (DUSD AS&C) and the Program Manager, 
Information Systems (PM IS) at Marine Corps Systems Command 
30 
(MARCORSYSCOM). Following an abbreviated review process, the SUL ACTD was 
approved on 11 December 1998. 
Quick approval can probably be attributed to several factors, namely that the USD 
(A&T) was already aware of the proposal, and that it involved a low relative cost: $3M 
over two years. The strength of the idea was also a bonus, since the ACTD would address 
a gap in current capability with technology while also providing an end-state Concept of 
Operations (CONOPS) for technology-enabled CSS command and control (C2).  
When its Implementation Directive (ID) was signed, the key players in the SUL 
ACTD were: 
• Operational Sponsor: Pacific Command 
• Operational Manager (OM): 1st FSSG, which delegated responsibilities to 
Brigade Service Support Group 1 (BSSG-1) 
• Technical Manager (TM): ONR 
• Executive Agent: MARCORSYSCOM, delegated to PM IS 
• U.S. Army: Joint participant with no resources contributed. 
• Transition Manager (XM): PM-IS 
The goals of the ACTD were: 
“…to demonstrate a “proof-of-concept” to improve logistics command 
and coordination [CC] in a joint environment, improve combat service 
support effectiveness and efficiency, and reduce the tactical unit logistics 
footprint.”23 
The ID also identified estimates of logistical improvements that would be realized as the 
utility of SUL was demonstrated. One the ACTDs targets was to achieve a 25% smaller 
logistical ‘footprint’, which refers to CSS units stockpiling potentially needed supplies. 
Another target was to reduce another key identifier of CSS performance, repair cycle 
time, by 40%.  
C. SUL MIDDLE PHASE 
1. Transition Planning & Preparation 
Transition Management, although assigned to the PM IS, was actually handled by 
a Transition Integrated Product Team (TIPT) composed of three principal individuals. 
The first was a contractor (hired at ONR expense) who physically worked with the PM  
IS. The second was a Navy Science & Technology (S&T) professional assigned to work 
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transition issues (also physically at MARCORSYSCOM). The third was an ONR S&T 
engineer who worked closely with the TM. 
The goal of SUL was to become an acquisition program, and the TIPT planned 
accordingly. Their idea was to closely mirror the documents required by the USMC 
Milestone III (MSIII) Milestone Decision Authority (MDA) to make his/her decision 
(whether to begin an acquisition program). The mirroring idea was necessitated by the 
fact that the DoD 5000 process specifies background documents (i.e. Testing Evaluation 
Master Plan (TEMP), Acquisition Program Baseline (APB), Mission Needs Statement 
(MNS), and Operational Requirements Document (ORD) in order for an MSIII decision 
to be made. The TIPT called their plan ‘ghosting the 5000’. For example, whereas the 
formal acquisition process required a TEMP, the SUL transitional method called for a 
Design Assessment Master Plan, or DAMP, and where an APB was required, the SUL 
team used a Systems Engineering Master Plan (SEMP). 
The goal of the TIPT was to create an environment conducive to a smooth 
transition of SUL to a MARCORSYSCOM-managed formal acquisition program. 
Planning for transition in the case of the SUL ACTD was made considerably easier 
because the end product of the demonstration was Government Off-the-Shelf (GOTS) 
software. Replication of GOTS software is as simple as making copies, putting those 
copies on compact disk (CD) media, and then distributing the CDs. Also, since two 
members of the TIPT worked at the Executive Agent’s facility, they were able to closely 
coordinate the interface between the System Engineering Integration & Test (SEI&T) and 
Transition Planning and Preparation (TPP) processes. 
2. System Engineering Integration & Test 
The development plan for SUL called for spending the first four months of the 
ACTD in an ‘architecture phase’ wherein Sea Dragon logistical software modules would 
be integrated with theater-level Army C2 systems, communication links, and joint 
information systems. The goal of the architecture phase was to have an integrated 
developmental baseline (plan) by the end of the ACTDs first year. The second year was 
to be spent integrating web-based network security programs from the Defense Advanced 
Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and adding decision support functionality to the 
SUL product. 
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The SUL Management Plan (MP) wasn’t signed until May of 1999. The SEI&T 
phase is a very management-intensive process, so for all practical purposes it didn’t begin 
until the MP was approved via signature. The ACTD kicked off (in June) with a TM/OM 
meeting to define SUL data elements, information requirements, and information sources. 
Attending the meeting was the TM, her team from ONR, and a group of company-grade 
officers and Staff Non-Commissioned Officers (SNCOs) from 1st FSSG sent to represent 
the OM. The OM representatives sent to the kick-off meeting were working level 
managers like maintenance and supply officers, not commanders. Since they were sent to 
attend by the OM, the TM assumed that their input into the requirements definition of 
SUL reflected the needs of the OM. Unfortunately the input the TM received from the 
OM representatives reflected their working-level needs, which were significantly 
different than those needed by a CSS commander to make C2 decisions. 
After the kickoff meeting, the first six months of the ACTD (June to December 
1999) were spent in an architecture phase instead of four months as was originally 
planned, with the TM focusing efforts on the enhancement and integration of the 
logistical software modules identified by the OM representatives (managerial-level). As 
the architecture phase was coming to a close, the PM IS (as the MARCORSYSCOM-
delegated executive agent) made a decision to focus the functionality of SUL on 
executive-level C2 rather than worker-level management. That decision effectively 
negated the previous six months of SEI&T effort since only one of the Sea Dragon 
modules involved C2. 
After a proposal-solicitation process, a software-development contractor located 
in Los Angeles California was hired to build the SUL software. Since the operators of 
SUL (1st FSSG) were at Camp Pendleton in Southern California, location was a factor 
considered in the contracting process. To deal with a contractor so far away from both the 
executive agent and TM, a navy contract specialist from Port Hueneme CA was brought 
on to the SUL team. 
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The core of the SEI&T process was ‘spiral development’ (ref. Figure 4.1) of the 
SUL software, an approach agreed upon between the TM and the contractor. The spiral 
concept is a well-known form of software engineering wherein the design of a program 
becomes more specific as time progresses. The specificity with SUL was gained as the 
users (the OM and his representatives) clarified their requirements. The contractor was 
then expected to translate identified requirements into software functionality. To make 
the spiral process work, the TM scheduled a series of Requirements Implementation 
Processes (RIPs), meetings between the users and the contractor. The RIP meetings also 
had the added benefit of allowing the contractor to gain understanding of military culture. 
Three RIPs were conducted: September and November 1999, and January 2000. Figure 4-1. SUL SEI&T Activities 
The actual coding of the SUL program began after the last RIP, and continued 
until an integration test was held in May 2000. From January until May, the contractor 
built a base-line system (with limited functionality) to use in the integration test, a 
brigade-sized exercise held at Twentynine Palms CA called Combined Arms Exercise 
(CAX) 5/6. The CSS unit for the exercise included all the OM-delegated managers that 
met in June 1999 as well as the OM himself, who was the CSSE Commanding Officer 
(CO). 
During the integration test, a misunderstanding between the TM and OM 
developed, characterized later by the TM as an expectation management problem. SUL 
was used by the CSS element during the CAX, but the operators expected much more 
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functionality from the program than was scheduled to exist at that time. They expected to 
use a fully functional prototype application similar to what they had become accustomed 
to during Sea Dragon exercises. The CAX 5/6 test was directed by the TM however, who 
envisioned the CAX as a ‘technical characterization’. The TM and OM had different 
expectations, and the end result of the misunderstanding was that the importance of the 
ACTD was downgraded in the eyes of the OM and his operators. 
Because of the misunderstanding at CAX 5/6, as well as the receipt by the 
contractor and TM of additional requirements, the MUA demonstration of SUL was 
pushed back from September 2000 to December 2000. Originally, a later CAX was to be 
used for the SUL MUA demonstration, but the TM decided that the program (and the 
contractor) needed more time. CAX 5/6 also had several more unintended results. First, it 
made the TM very cautious of putting any sort of program prototype in the hands of the 
operators for fear that their expectations would be higher than what was practically 
realizable. Second, the operators became suspicious of the TM’s ability to accurately 
translate their requirements to the contactor. The operators began a progress-damaging 
dialogue directly with the contractor regarding functionality enhancements, which risked 
voiding the contractor’s contract and circumventing the TM’s responsibilities. Testing of 
future SUL prototypes was conducted via Mini-Tests (ref. Figure 4-1) at the contractor’s 
facility (using Marine operators) in June and September 2000, under the close 
supervision of TM representatives. 
The SEI&T phase of the SUL ACTD effectively ended in mid-November 2000 
with a TM-supervised and rigorously enforced government acceptance test. Since the TM 
had been working closely with both the TIPT and the executive agent, a draft ORD was 
presented to MARCORSYSCOM to assist with transition. The afore-mentioned 
acceptance test was conducted two weeks before the MUA demonstration, Exercise 
Desert Knight. 
3. Military Utility Assessment 
The MUA for the SUL ACTD was originally scheduled for two months after 
CAX 5/6, at another CAX (7/8). Because of the misunderstanding that occurred during 
the first CAX the MUA was pushed to the next exercise in which BSSG-1 would take 
part, which happened to be Desert Knight, scheduled for November and December 2000. 
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Figure 4-2. MUA and DD Activities 
The same contractor as was hired for TPP planned the MUA with help from the 
Center for Naval Analysis (CNA). CNA’s role in the MUA was the design and collection 
of statistics that, through analysis, could verify that SUL met its target metrics. The OM 
worked closely with a different contractor, Science Applications International 
Corporation (SAIC), to design the demonstration itself. The SUL Integrated Plan of 
Action & Milestones (POA&M) called for a Demonstration activity within the second 
phase of the ACTD, and activity on par with SEI&T, TPP, and MUA. The Demonstration 
Design (DD) activity (ref. Figure 4-2) included many actions normally associated with 
SEI&T as and MUA, but was deemed important enough to be classified as its own 
activity. Both MUA and DD were focused on preparation for SUL’s final demonstration 
in December 2000. MUA planning concentrated on analyses of the SUL software itself, 
as well as the submittal of three reports to the OIPT. The DD focused upon the practical 
needs of a successful demonstration like people, training manuals, hardware, location of a 
suitable facility, and the communication links to be used. The SUL team referred to 
demonstration preparation as Block Training. Block Training was conducted before CAX 
5/6, before the planned-for CAX 7/8, and before the final system assessment during 
Desert Knight. 
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The MUA itself took place from 3 to 10 December 2000 as planned. Coordination 
amongst the operators, the demonstration designer (SAIC), and the data collectors (CNA) 
was close, so the demonstration itself went off without a hitch. All concerned with the 
SUL ACTD waited for results from CNA, and anticipated what decision 
MARCORSYSCOM would make concerning transition.  
D. TRANSITION PHASE 
After Desert Knight, the PM IS decided to field the residual SUL product but not 
begin an acquisition program. That decision was reached not on the basis of SUL’s merits 
as a CSS C2 software application, but on the lack of a Mission Needs Statement (MNS). 
An acquisition program within the Marine Corps must be based upon a MNS, and by the 
time the SUL ACTD was complete, none had been approved. 
The lack of a MNS was a roadblock for SUL’s smooth transition into an 
acquisition program at MARCORSYSCOM, but timing and funding were also 
problematic. Since the SUL ACTD demonstration occurred in Nov/Dec 2000, the first 
quarter of Fiscal Year (FY) 01, immediate MSIII acceptance of SUL would have meant 
MARCORSYSCOM had (on-hand) budgeted money to pay for production. That was a 
practical impossibility given how the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System 
(PPBS) works: monies appropriated to MARCORSYSCOM in FY01 must have been 
planned for in FY99, when SUL was in its infancy. Because of the timing of SUL’s 
approval and its lack of a budget line, MARCORSYSCOM couldn’t fund further 
development until FY02 at the earliest. 
Luckily for MARCORSYSCOM, fielding of residual GOTS software is 
extremely cheap since license fees aren’t involved, and the SUL software was fully 
government-owned. Copies of the final version of SUL were distributed to all four 
Marine Force Service Support Groups. As described in Chapter 3, ONR is committed to 
supporting SUL for two years after the MUA, and is currently doing so. 
Lastly, the PM IS and the Logistics sponsor at Headquarters Marine Corps 
(HQMC) decided against fully fielding SUL based on several technical roadblocks that 
were not resolved prior to the demonstration. A few of those factors were: 
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• SUL was based on Microsoft software architecture standards, which are 
different than those specified in the Defense Information 
Infrastructure/Common Operating Environment (DII/COE). 
• SUL was the front end ‘portal’ of a back-end help-desk application 
developed by and for the Marines themselves during Sea Dragon. The two 
applications’ interfaces were not well defined, and the two applications 
had different architectures. 
• The back-end application was not written in a scalable, stable 
programming language, and since SUL relied upon its back-end for data, 
SUL itself wasn’t scalable. 
• The back-end, legacy, mainframe-based applications (and data) that SUL 
relied upon to perform its functions correctly did not allow dynamic, push-
pull type updating, a problem that SUL identified but which wasn’t solved 
before the ACTD concluded. 
 
Issues like those identified above were based upon high-level requirements placed upon 
all DoD software applications targeted to service-wide or joint usage. In the case of SUL, 
two years of development was not enough time to ‘work out all the bugs’. 
E. FUNDING 
The Expeditionary Logistics section at ONR, which has an approximate yearly 
budget of $24M, funded SUL. Year to year, the Navy is appropriated $1.4B for S&T 
programs. Of that amount, Expeditionary Logistics receives $20M, with another $4M 
coming from the Marine Corps’ $55M S&T dollars. The SUL ACTD itself was budgeted 
$3M to be spread over two years. The bulk of that money was paid to the contractor 
developing SUL, with smaller amounts being paid to the on-staff contractor, SAIC, and 
CNA. 
The money for SUL was ‘locked in’ by the participants’ signatures on the ID, 
much the same as acquisition dollars are committed via budget lines. Freedom to tailor 
spending, in the case of SUL, was in the hands of the TM. As previously mentioned, 
contracts with civilian companies, as well as CNA, were handled from Port Hueneme. 
The on-staff contractor was paid directly by the TM. After the dust settled, the SUL 
ACTD met its spending goals and budgetary limits. 
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F. MANAGEMENT 
None of the principle players in SUL had any experience with ACTDs before they 
took part in the SUL ACTD. Since most players were Marines, the fact that the Marine 
Corps had participated in only one ACTD prior to SUL played a part in its management. 
This inexperience relative to the other services was balanced, at least in part, by the 
involvement of ONR, which had a wealth of knowledge of R&D procedures, including 
ACTDs. The most significant occurrence regarding the management of SUL has already 
been discussed at length: the misunderstanding at CAX 5/6 between the operators and the 
technicians. That misunderstanding was a result of the Marines’ lack of experience with 
ACTDs. 
The relations between the TM, OM, and Executive Agent were the dynamics 
affecting the Management of SUL. The relative lack of knowledge regarding ACTDs on 
the Marines’ part was amplified by the designation of an Executive Agent who 
specialized in DoD 5000-type procurement. Because of that experience, the PM IS was 
reluctant to field a ‘good’ answer, and seemed to want perfection. As well, it seems that 
the Executive Agent may have approached the ACTD process as a PM would an 
acquisition. For example, directing that SUL be a C2 system instead of a management 
system would normally be a TM decision. The PM IS was given latitude by both the OM 
and the TM since their goal was for SUL to become an acquisition… a decision likely to 
be made on the recommendation of the PM IS. 
There were two OM’s of the SUL ACTD: two successive commanders of BSSG-
1. The first OM, as is the prerogative of Marine Colonels, delegated to his staff the 
management of SUL. Unfortunately, that delegation cost the ACTD and the LA-based 
contractor six months, or ¼ of the ACTDs funded lifecycle. Fortunately for the ACTD, a 
new Commanding Officer (CO) of BSSG-1 was assigned midway through its lifecycle, 
and the new CO/second OM took his responsibilities as OM personally. For example, the 
second OM ordered that SUL be used (even as a prototype) for all garrison CSS C2, not 
just for field exercises. 
It is interesting to note that although a Transition Manager (XM) was assigned, 
transition planning was accomplished by a TIPT, none of whose members were at a 
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managerial level on par with the TM and OM. In fact, one person handled most transition 
planning activities, a contractor, and he was getting paid by (working for) the TM to 
handle transition issues and liaise with the PM IS on behalf of ONR. The management of 
transition activities for SUL is a good example of both tailoring and IPPD. 
G. CONCLUSION 
The Small Unit Logistics ACTD kicked off in late 1998 after an abbreviated 
selection process. It was funded by ONR, and managed jointly by MARCORSYCSOM, 
1st FSSG, and ONR. After a slow start due to misdirected effort and some adjustments 
because of miscommunication, the participants in the ACTD spent 18 months doing their 
best to field a tactical logistics C2 capability to the Marine Corps. 
When the final demonstration of SUL took place in December 2000, the 
Executive Agent decided against transitioning the ACTD into an acquisition program. 
Even though the managers’ goal was ostensibly to become a formal acquisition program 
and that didn’t happen, the SUL ACTD proved successful beyond its original scope. 
What started as an idea to enable tactical CSS commanders to exercise C2 over 
their mission areas became much more. Despite its relatively meager funding level, and 
its failure to transition to an acquisition, the SUL ACTD accomplished the following: 
• It raised awareness within the Marine Corps on the lack of C2 capabilities 
resident in tactical CSS elements, initiating a discussion that included 
articles published in the Marine Corps Gazette, an article written by the 
second OM/CO of BSSG-1. 
• It highlighted gaps in technological capability that existed but had never 
been focused upon, and sparked follow-on actions on the part of ONR, 
MARCORSYCOM, and HQMC. Those will be explained shortly. 
• The ACTD extended the life of the AWE-generated software modules, 
and provided a way for those applications to contribute to Marine-Corps-
wide improvements in power projection and force lethality. 
• The ACTD process gained visibility with the Marine Corps, the service 
that prior to SUL had only participated in one ACTD. If/when additional 
ACTDs are initiated by or participated in by Marines, they’ll have a much 
better idea how to succeed based on lessons learned via SUL. 
• In defining requirements for SUL, the Marine Corps gained a better 
understanding and definition of C2 as opposed to Command and 
Coordination (CC). Coordination in the context of SUL is internal 
awareness whereas control is external. A CSS commander needs both, and 
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the SUL ACTD helped clarify how much control and coordination a CSSE 
commander needs to accomplish his or her mission. 
The gap in Marines’ technological ability to exercise C2 over CSS elements 
raised eyebrows across the Marine Corps. Ideas that had been fomenting in the minds of 
Marine logisticians, including ideas generated as a result of the SUL ACTD, began to 
gather at Headquarters, Marine Corps (HQMC). Those ideas eventually generated action. 
For example, in the first three months of 2001, the following occurred: 
• The Logistical Advocate at HQMC, a 3-star General, approved a 
Universal Needs Statement (UNS) for CSS C2. No longer would the lack 
of a MNS keep logistical C2 systems like SUL and its back-end from 
becoming acquisition programs. The UNS was signed on March 27, 2001. 
• The increases in power projection and force lethality to be gained from a 
logistical C2 capability began to be understood. That understanding of 
possibilities sparked the publication of a Marine Corps Logistics 
Campaign Plan, released on January 1, 2001. 
Possibly more significant than the UNS or the Logistics Campaign Plan was the 
conceptualization of possible changes in CSS doctrine. Those changes would be possible 
if tactical CSS C2 was a reality instead of a goal. 
 Even though the SUL ACTD didn’t become an acquisition program, its 
CONOPS and ideas generated as a result of it goal of tactical CSS C2 made it successful 
at a higher level. This is not speculation but fact, evidenced by the fact that ONR, 
MARCORSYSCOM, and the logisticians from HQMC have initiated a new ACTD. The 
new program is called the “CSS Commander’s Toolkit”, and it includes SUL-like C2 
software as well as sensors, data transmission requirements, architectural definition 
requirements, and CONOPS development. Participants in the new ACTD include the XM 
(contractor) from the SUL ACTD as well as the SUL TM and her principal assistant, both 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
The following conclusions reflect areas in which the experiences of the SUL 
Advance Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD), as well as the standard ACTD 
process, can provide lessons applicable to the formal DoD 5000 acquisition process 
(ACQ). 
1) User Involvement: The ACTD process includes a concept that exists 
conceptually in the ACQ process but is rarely present: user involvement. All ACTDs 
have Operational Managers (OMs), whose role is to provide constant user input into the 
development process. This core facet of ACTDs differs from the ACQ process, wherein 
users are included primarily in defining requirements, and are then consulted periodically 
(sometimes not at all) in formal-phase activities. The constant and active involvement of 
operators is an improvement over the DoD 5000 process. 
The negative side of having increased user involvement was demonstrated very 
well by the experiences of the SUL ACTD managers. An OM may have considerable 
expertise in his or her functional area such as logistics, but little or no experience in 
Science & Technology (S&T) processes, practices, and procedures. Managerial problems 
arose with SUL partly because of the afore-mentioned inexperience and partly due to 
communication lapses between the managers. Having two to four co-equal managers of 
interdependent and simultaneous processes, as is the case with ACTDs, can be a recipe 
for disaster if the personalities of the managers clash or they fail to communicate clearly 
and constantly with each other. What ties them together is their goal of concluding a 
successful demonstration, but that may also be a trap if success is not clearly defined. 
2) Reduced Oversight: Both the ACTD and DoD 5000 processes’ managerial 
practices are based upon the tenets of tailoring and Integrated Product and Process 
Development (IPPD), but the ability to tailor either process is largely dependent upon the 
oversight placed upon managers. Since the ACTD process, even for a high-cost ACTD, 
mandates less oversight, the managers of an ACTD have more freedom to tailor than 
their counterparts in acquisitions, who are tied by law to certain reporting and oversight 
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levels. An excellent example of tailoring was exhibited in the SUL ACTD in that the 
managers decided to create the additional, co-equal middle-phase process of 
Demonstration Development, a decision that would not be possible under the DoD 5000 
acquisition process. 
3) Acquisition Chain of Command: From the standpoint of clear decision-
making and execution, the advantage lies with the DoD 5000 process for one simple 
reason: chain of command. An ACTD has at least two co-equal managers as stated 
earlier, and problems may arise if personalities clash or the managers fail to 
communicate. Each manager is in charge of his or her responsible area, which should be 
focused upon clearly defined measures of success. Also, the managers of an ACTD 
answer to an Overarching Integrated Product Team (IPT) that may meet as seldom as 
every six months. This contrasts sharply with the DoD 5000 acquisition process, in which 
a Program Manager is the sole person in charge of decision-making, and has the power to 
direct the execution of his/her program. There is a clearly defined chain of authority with 
acquisition programs that does not exist with ACTDs: the IPTs report to the PM, who 
answers to the Program Executive Officer (PEO), who reports to the Milestone Decision 
Authority (MDA). 
4) Option of Technology-Push Initiation: To begin an acquisition program, a 
mission requirement must be clearly detailed in a Mission Needs Statement (MNS). In 
order to draft a MNS, its authors must also conceive a Concept of Operations (CONOPS), 
which is an idea of how an ACQ product will satisfy the needs outlined in the MNS. The 
MNS/CONOPS reliance of ACQs contrasts with ACTDs, which can be initiated based on 
needs but also may begin with nothing more than a technology of possible use to DoD. 
The SUL ACTD was initiated by a mission need and a preliminary CONOPS, but during 
the course of its execution it transcended both. That transcendence is evidenced in how 
the SUL ACTD seeded ideas for a new Marine Corps Logistics Campaign Plan and by 
the initiation of a more encompassing ACTD as a result of SUL. 
5) Speed of Formulation/Selection: An ACTD initiated under standard 
procedures takes less than a year to gain approval once an idea is submitted. Also, ideas 
can be submitted from multiple commands, not just Commanders in Chief (CINCs). 
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Proposals are subjected to a complete multi-level review before being approved by 
signature of an Implementation Directive (ID). To begin an ACQ, a need must be 
submitted, reviewed, studied, and justified at many levels before becoming a formal 
program. The ACQ process includes the drafting and multi-level staffing of a MNS as 
well as an Operational Requirements Document (ORD). The lesson to be learned from 
ACTDs is timeliness, evidenced by the several-month approval process required to get 
SUL approved. 
6) Budgetary Freedom: The type of funds used to complete the ACQ and ACTD 
processes varies. Acquisitions use funds earmarked by Congress for specific programs, 
and Congress enforces its spending laws by tying each and every ACQ to a budget line, 
which is not the case with ACTDs. Congress approves the money used to fund ACTDs in 
broad categories (detailed in Table 2-2). That contrast is minor but significant. It gives 
defense labs and services the freedom to spend their S&T dollars in a more discretionary 
manner than procurement funding, a freedom that gives ACTDs flexibility ACQs do not 
have. 
7) Secured Funding: Once the ID for an ACTD has been signed, whichever 
agency, service, or lab that agreed to fund the demonstration is committed whether or not 
the ACTD spans several years. Having funds assured and not having to re-justify the 
existence of their program gives ACTD managers more time and energy to spend on 
making their ACTD successful. It also allows ACTD managers to make 
cost/schedule/performance trade-off decisions with a long-term focus without having to 
worry that their decisions will affect funding. Also, ACTD managers are not forced to 
compete with other demonstrations for money, at least insofar as their ID has assured 
them funding for a specified period of time. Once again, freedom equates to flexibility, a 
lesson ACTDs can teach acquisitions. 
An area in which acquisitions have a toe up on ACTDs is that the process used to 
plan for and secure ACQ funding is designed to allow for producing an end product. 
ACTD managers are forced by the limitations of their process to act as an ACQ to ensure 
that their demonstration will have a budget line when it reaches transition. The SUL 
ACTD managers tried and failed to get funding since their demonstration wasn’t backed 
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by a MNS. If SUL was a formal acquisition program, it would have had a MNS and 
possibly a budget line, so transiting to a formal acquisition would have been possible.  
8) Possible Outcomes: When a warfighting need is identified, a Doctrine, 
Organization, Training, Education, and Systems (DOTES) analysis is completed. The 
analysis studies possible solutions that will satisfy the need. For example, if a service 
identifies a need for improved reliability of jet engines, a DOTES analysis may conclude 
that further training (the T of DOTES) of mechanics will satisfy the need. In order for an 
acquisition program to be initiated, the DOTES analysis must conclude that a system (the 
S of DOTES) is needed, so the end result of an acquisition is a system. Some ACTD 
proposals, those initiated by requirements pull, are also subjected to a DOTES analyses 
and the result must also be that a system is needed. The advantage of ACTDs comes from 
technology push ACTDS. In those cases, the end-state of the ACTD is a DOTES analysis, 
as in “Based on the proven result of the demonstrated technology, we need to change our 
doctrine and reorganize.” The SUL ACTD provides an example of both possibilities 
since it was initiated by a requirement and was subjected to a DOTES analysis, yet 
resulted in DOTES outcomes. The Marine Corps Logistics Campaign Plan (doctrine, the 
D or DOTES) and the follow-on “CSS Commander’s Toolkit” ACTD (system, the S of 
DOTES) that resulted from SUL would never have occurred had SUL been a formal 
acquisition program. 
9) Streamlined Process: The ACQ process is cumbersome compared to the 
relatively streamlined ACTD process. For example, the DoD 5000 process requires a Test 
and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP), an Acquisition Program Baseline (APB), and a 
Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) in order to move from Phase 1 to Phase 2, as well as a 
Milestone 2 (MSII) decision to proceed into Phase 2. For an ACTD to proceed from its 
Formulation and Selection Phase to its Middle Phase only one document is approved and 
no formal decision made.  
The formal acquisition process is typified by documentation, oversight, and 
formal decisions. All three exist because the process is sequential, and because it was 
designed to increase the chances of successful programs. In addition, the ACQ process 
was designed to identify programs with a low chance of success and kill them before they 
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lose money. This is a rather cumbersome way to accomplish an admirable goal, but the 
point is that the process is controlled. The ACTD process, on the other hand, while 
providing freedom to demonstration managers, also gives oversight teams fewer 
opportunities to cancel demonstrations that go astray. ACTDs are also locked in, as 
previously mentioned, by the signatures on their IDs, and the only way to kill an 
established ACTD is to get all signatories to agree again. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The goals of the ACTD and DoD 5000 acquisition (ACQ) processes are similar in 
that they both strive to satisfy requirements identified by warfighters. The difference is 
that the ACQ process’ goal is to fully field a capability useful to warfighters, whereas 
ACTDs are intended to prove concepts. The Small Unit Logistics (SUL) ACTD was 
initiated to refine and apply technologies that existed at its inception, with the goal of 
becoming an acquisition process, and provides and excellent example of how the two 
processes (ACQ and ACTD) can and should be complimentary. 
Based upon the events and experiences of the SUL ACTD, as well as the 
overviews of both the ACTD and DoD 5000 processes, it is possible to recommend 
several areas in which the formal acquisition process can be optimized..  
1. Initiation  
In the context of this thesis, initiation refers to the ease with which either the ACQ 
or ACTD process can be started. Based upon the procedures detailed in earlier chapters, 
the initiation protocol for ACTDs represent an improvement upon that of acquisitions. 
Both demonstrations and acquisitions are reviewed in detail and subjected to estimates, 
briefings, and needs analyses. The relative speed with which ACTDs are proposed and 
approved is the core ACTD improvement, and such speed would definitely improve the 
standard ACQ process. 
2. Process 
The standard processes followed by acquisitions and demonstrations were 
designed for different purposes. Formal acquisitions follow a sequential scheme since 
time is less a factor in judging success. As well, acquisitions are structured around formal 
Milestone Decisions, which govern whether or not a program can proceed to the next 
phase, again a time-consuming but possibly cost-saving construct. ACTDs, especially in 
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their middle phase, have several simultaneously occurring sub-processes that are 
scheduled that way to save time. Since the ACQ and ACTD processes were designed for 
different purposes, a one cannot provide lessons to the other. 
3. Funding 
Funding for both acquisitions and ACTDs goes through the Planning, 
Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS), but the relative freedom that DoD has in 
spending S&T money represents an improvement over the ACQ process. In addition 
since ACTD funding is locked in with ID signatures, managers working within the 
demonstration process are subjected neither to yearly reviews nor to inter-ACTD 
competition for money. The lesson provided is that budget management for ACQ 
managers would be a significantly less arduous task if acquisition funding resembled 
Science and Technology (S&T) funding. Reducing the time and effort ACQ Program 
Managers (PMs) spend on funding matters would free them to concentrate their efforts 
elsewhere. 
4. Management 
With either the ACQ or the ACTD process, the skills required of managers are 
largely the same: project management and leadership. Skill differences largely lie in 
background expertise in either technology or acquisitions. Both processes are Department 
of Defense (DoD) and Federal Government inventions, and as such have inherent 
bureaucratic overhead placed upon them. As was the case with the SUL ACTD, the 
presence of multiple co-equal managers increases the chances of miscommunication. 
Another possible outcome, which was not evidenced during the SUL ACTD, is that co-
equal managers will have personality conflicts to the detriment of the demonstration’s 
overall success. Based upon the experiences of the SUL ACTD as well as the standard 
ACTD and ACQ processes, ACTDs do not present a clear managerial improvement over 
acquisitions. 
Despite their considerable differences, both the ACQ and ACTD processes were 
designed for similar purposes. The ACQ process covers all systems required to satisfy an 
identified need, while the second was designed to speed mature technologies to 
warfighters, who may or may not realize their need. Despite the inherent bureaucratic 
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overhead that results from originating within DoD, the experiences of one ACTD can and 
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APPENDIX A: ACQUISITION CATEGORIES 
ACAT Selection Criteria ACAT Designation Authority 
Milestone Decision 
Authority 
 Weapon System Programs  
ID > $335M R&D > $2.135B PMC USD(A&T) USD(A&T) 
IC > $355M R&D > $2.135B PMC USD(A&T) ASN(RD&A) 
IAM 
> $30M 1 year 
> $120M total 
> $360M LCC 
ASD(C3I) OSD CIO 
IAC 
> $30M 1 year 
> $120M total 
> $360M LCC 
ASD(C3I) ASN(RD&A) 
II > $140M R&D > 645M PMC ASN(RDA) ASN(RD&A) 




< $645M PMC MARCORSYSCOM 
CMDR, SES, 
or PM 
 Information Technology Programs  
III-IT > $15M 1 year > $30M total MARCORSYSCOM CMDR, SES 
IV(T)-IT& 
IT-AAP 
< $15M 1 year 
< $30M total MARCORSYSCOM 
CMDR, SES, 
or PM 
Source: U.S. Marine Corps Acquisition Procedures Handbook; September 1999 
ASD(C3I)  Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Comm., Computers, and Intelligence) 
ASN(RD&A)  Assistant Secretary of the Navy (R&D and Acquisitions) 
CMDR   Commander 
OSD CIO  Office of the Secretary of Defense, Chief Information Officer 
PMC   Procurement, Marine Corps 
R&D   Research and Development 
USD (A&T)   Undersecretary of Defense (Acquisitions and Technology) 
SES   Senior Executive Service 
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